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Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands:
General Problems
Joseph Dainow*
The civil code revision program of the Netherlands has been
in progress since 1947 under the direction of Professor E. M.
Meijers. Just prior to his death in 1954, there was published the
proposed text and commentary of the first four books ;1 and in
1955, the fifth book2 was brought out by the committee which
was established to complete the work. One of the most interest-
ing phases of the program was the articulation by Professor
Meijers of certain policy problems in the form of questions which
the Minister of Justice submitted to the Legislature for instruc-
tive answers to guide the actual drafting of the detailed pro-
visions on these topics. This procedure and its significance,
together with an English translation of all the questions and
answers, forms the basis of another article.3
In the presentation and the discussion of these important
policy questions, there were many very interesting issues. Three
of the general problems form the basis of the present article,
4
namely, (1) the unprovided-for case (silence of the written law),
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. Acknowledgment is made
of the assistance of Jan Schoffeln as research assistant, L.S.U. Law School, in
connection with the translation and use of the original materials in the Dutch
language. Acknowledgment is also made to Air. P. Eijssen, Advisor to the Minister
of Justice of the Netherlands, for his kindness in reading the manuscript.
1. Meijers, Ontwerp voor cen Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek, Tekst, eerste gedeelte
Boek 1-4 (Draft of a New Civil Code, Text, Part One, Books 1-4) (The Hague
1954) ; Meijers, Ontwerp voor een Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek, Toelichting [Com-
mentary], eerste gedeelte Boek 1-4 (The Hague 1954). Book 1, Persons and the
Family; Book 2, Legal Persons; Book 3, Property in General; Book 4, In-
heritance.
2. Meijers, Ontwerp voor een Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek, Tekst, tweede
gedeelte [second part] Boek 5, completed by Drion, Eggens, and de Jong (The
Hague 1955) ; Meijers, Ontwerp voor een Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek, Toelichting,
tweede gedeelte Boek 5, completed by Drion, Eggens, and de Jong (The Hague
1955). Book 5, Corporeal Rights.
3. For organization and procedure in Second Chamber (lower house) of the
Legislature, see Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: The Fifty
Questions, 5 Am. J. CoMP. L. - (1957). Although the final action was not
conclusive and binding, it served a very practical purpose of ascertaining and
crystallizing legal and public opinion, thereby establishing the kind of guiding
principles which could not be overturned without adequate and appropriate reason.
4. Most of the information and material for this article is found in the reports
of the legislature which were compiled into the document identified as Second
Chamber, Zitting [Session] 1952-53, No. 2846. This is supplemented on the basis
of personal conferences and discussions in the Netherlands, while the writer was
there as Guggenheim Fellow in 1954.
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(2) the extent of government participation in certain private
contracts, and (3) the effect of custom as against legislation. In
order to convey the flavor of the give and take in the discussions
and exchanges of opinion, each phase of the procedure will be
described separately. Other questions will be treated in subse-
quent articles.
I. THE UNPROVIDED-FOR CASE (SILENCE OF THE LAW)
A. The Problem
Although a civil code consists of a comprehensive system of
interwoven principles and rules, it never purports to cover and
to anticipate every possible future situation. At the same time,
there is the classical civilian concept that the legislative body
makes the law, while the function of the judiciary is to interpret
and apply the law. This leaves the judge in a dilemma when he is
confronted with a problem for which there is no specific law nor
any basis for extension by analogy or otherwise. Such cases on
which the law is silent or insufficient - the so-called "unpro-
vided-for" cases - were not unforeseen by the codifiers. In
some codes, there is a provision which constitutes the judge a
legislator for the particular situation,5 or which gives him item-
ized instructions about successive methods to follow towards
reaching a solution.0 The French Civil Code 7 orders that a judge
cannot avoid giving a decision on the pretext that there is no
law. In the law of the Netherlands, there is a similar provision. 8
It is accordingly not unexpected that the problem of the un-
provided-for case appears in the fifty questions which were sub-
mitted to the legislature in the process of the current civil code
revision program.
B. The Question and the Recommended Answer 9
Question 23. Should there be a legal provision how law
is to be found in case the [written] laws are silent?
By way of explanation, it was pointed out that, while differ-
ent countries dealt with the problem in different ways, the gen-
5. SWITZERLAND CIVIL CODE art. 1.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870); PUERTO RICO CIVIL CODE § 7.
7. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 4.
8. Wet Algemene Bepalingen, May 15, 1829 (General Provisions on the Leg-
islation of the Kingdom), art. 13.
9. See note 4 supra, item no. 5, p. 1.
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eral tendency was to give some indication to the judge for his
instruction and guidance.
It was affirmed that the existing code which was promul-
gated in 1838 had recognized the problem but that the legislature
had chosen the alternative of making no mention of it. The only
reference to custom is in Article 3 of the law of May 15, 1829,
containing general provisions on the legislation of the Kingdom:
"Custom does not create law except in cases where the written
law refers to custom.' °
Nevertheless, the preliminary answer recommended by the
Minister of Justice (and Professor Meijers) was an affirmative
one, that there should be provision for finding the law in case of
silence of the written law, with indication of the following order
of reference: first, the legal principles upon which the [written]
law is based; second, custom (usage) ; and third, equity.
In support of this recommendation were cited the texts and
experiences of Switzerland, Spain, France, Louisiana, and others.
C. Issues Raised by the Legislative Committee"
The legislative committee which studied the matter raised a
number of questions and issues, along the following lines:
(1) A, codification can never cover all cases. Would it not
be "ultra vires" for the legislature to set out rules of public pol-
icy on methods to reach legal solutions in case of silence of the
written law?
(2) Since it will sometimes be very difficult to decide
whether the law is silent or not, is it not better to make no rules
for these cases?
(3) If some rules are to be given, it might be desirable not
to indicate any order of priority nor to attempt a complete list
of all sources of law outside of legislation. It might be better to
indicate how the legal solution can be found, rather than how it
should be reached.
(4) The list of sources in the recommended answer is in-
complete. For example, the statute (Article 38) of the Interna-
10. Wet Algemene Bepalingen, May 15, 1829 (General Provisions on the Leg-
islation of the Kingdom), art. 3.
11. See note 4 supra, item no. 20, p. 1.
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tional Court of Justice also lists international conventions, court
decisions, and qualified writers as recognized sources of law.
(5) The recommended source of "legal principles upon which
the [written] law is based" would seem to bind the judges to
the ideas of the time that the written law was formulated. If
these principles are crystallized, they will stand in the way of
future legal development. A different formula, "the commonly
accepted principles of law," might be preferable because it leaves
to the judge the possibility of deciding according to the prin-
ciples of law commonly accepted at the time of his decision.
(6) The order of priority indicated in the recommendation
- (1) legal principles; (2) custom; (3) equity - does not ap-
pear consistent with the proposal in Question 25 (see infra) that
a deviating custom should prevail over the written law. At the
same time, the judge would presumably look to custom only if it
conforms to equity.
(7) Is there any difference between the words "custom" and
"usage"?
(8) In this context, what is meant by "equity"?
D. Reply by Minister of Justice2
The Minister of Justice, assisted by Professor Meijors and by
Mr. P. Eijssen, Advisor to the Minister, replied to these ques-
tions and issues raised by the legislative committee in the follow-
ing manner, and corresponding to the questions.
(1) It is not "ultra vires" for legislation to incorporate policy
rules for the guidance of judges, and this has always been done.
Illustrations are found in Articles 1375 and 1401 of the Civil
Code of the Netherlands 8 as interpreted by the courts.
(2) The difficulty of determining whether there is any ap-
propriate written law does not really have anything to do with
the instructions concerning other sources of law after having
12. Id. item no. 25, p. 1.
13. Of. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1135, 1382; LA. CIvIL CoDE arts. 1903, 2315
(1870).
LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1903 (1870): "The obligation of contracts extends not
only to what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything that, by law, equity
or custom, is considered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to
carry It into effect."
LA. CIvm CODE art. 2315 (1870) : "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. . ..
[Vol. XVII
REVISION IN THE NETHERLANDS
decided that the case is one for which the written law is silent
or insufficient.
(3) When giving instructions about other sources of law, it
is necessary to state an order of priority because there may be
contradiction or inconsistency between two of these sources.
(4) The recommended list of sources is complete for the pur-
poses contemplated. (See also in item (8) below.) The inclu-
sion of court decisions and the doctrines of famous jurists, as in
Article 38(1) (d) of the statute of the International Court of
Justice is not desirable in the Netherlands. It is not good to bind
later generations to the decisions of earlier judges; even the cur-
rent decisions of a higher court are not binding on the lower
court judges.
(5) The "legal principles upon which the [written] law is
based" are those principles which the written law might well
have stated; while they are not specifically expressed, they are
implicit and are generally ascertained by analogy. This formula
is preferable to "commonly accepted principles of law" because
the latter may be construed to include also foreign principles.
There is no danger that the development of the basic principles
would be frozen as of the time of a codification because legisla-
tion continues to fulfill its task and its basic principles are kept
up-to-date.
(6) The priorities given in the recommended answer are
based on the following reasons: (1) "legal principles upon which
the [written] law is based" are placed first and should follow
immediately after the written law because of the close rela-
tionship to it - "custom" (usage) cannot be placed first for the
same reason that it cannot be ranked higher than written regu-
lations (under legislative authority); (2) "custom" is placed
above "equity" because it is a stronger source of law - some-
times custom may supersede a regulative law but equity cannot
do so except under very special circumstances; the relation be-
tween custom and equity should be such that the former would
not be applied if it would create a result contrary to equity in a
given case.
(7) The words "custom" and "usage" are employed inter-
changeably. For example, contract clauses that are found in
common use are generally considered as constituting a usage.
19571 277
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(8) The meaning of "equity" will have to be defined so as to
take into account both public and private interests, and also the
legal convictions existing in the Dutch people. The proposed list-
ing of sources is complete because equity comprises all those
principles of law which are not expressed in the written law and
which are not found in the general principles which are the basis
of the written law or in custom.
In the drafting of the Introductory Title, Professor Meijers
included a proposed Article 7, which reads as follows:
"When deciding what equity requires there should be
taken into account the generally recognized principles of law,
the legal convictions of the Dutch people, and the social and
personal interests with regard to the particular case."
E. Final Answer 14
When the legislative committee reported to the Second Cham-
ber (lower house of the legislature), it stated its agreement with
the answer originally recommended by the Minister of Justice
and Professor Meijers. The discussion on the floor of the house
did not raise any further issues, and the final action was the
adoption of the original recommended answer. Although the
Dutch judges may well have been doing in some measure what
was here outlined, there had never been such an explicit pro-
vision in the written law, and this decision can be considered as
a proposed new law.15
F. Comparative Comments
The problem of the unprovided-for case - absence or insuf-
ficiency of written text in a civil law system - is by no means a
new one.' 6
14. See note 4, at 2865 et seq. (Sept. 8, 1953), supra.
15. Formal drafts of law have been presented to the Second Chamber for the
adoption of the Introductory Title and Books I-IV of the new Civil Code (Second
Chamber, Session 1954-1955, Nos. 3766-3771), and on some of the subjects there
have been written discussions between the Minister of Justice and the Committee
of the Second Chamber.
The policy decisions of Questions 23 and 25 discussed in this article are in-
corporated and implemented in the Introductory Title. The nature and substance
of these provisions can be illustrated by a few loosely translated excerpts, as
follows: "Neither custom nor equity can exclude the applicability of a manda-
tory law" (Art. 1) ; "The applicability of a regulatory law becomes invalid when
contrary to common usage" (Art. 2) ; "A regulatory law or custom will not be
applied where such application would be apparently inequitable" (Art. 3) ; "Gen-
eral principles of law which are the basis of the written law are considered as an
application of the written law" (Art. 5).
16. Dainow, The Method of Legal Development Through Judicial Interpreta-
tion in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 REvISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNEaSIDAD DE
[Vol. XVII
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In 1804, the French Civil Code incorporated the following
provisions:
Civil Code of France, Article 4. "The judge who refuses
to decide a case on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure
or insufficient, is liable to be prosecuted for a denial of
justice."
Article 5. "On cases submitted to them, judges are not al-
lowed to decide by way of general or rule-making decisions."
A similar type of provision is contained in the Civil Code of
Quebec 17 and a slightly expanded one in the Civil Code of
Mexico.' 8
Another type of code provision which deals with this problem
is the one which not only instructs the judge to make a decision
but at the same time indicates the successive paths to take in
the process. One such text is found in Louisiana:
Civil Code of Louisiana, Article 21. "In all civil matters,
where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed
and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal
is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages,
where positive law is silent."
A variation with elements of both preceding types of provi-
sion is found in Spain:
Civil Code of Spain, Article 6. "Any Court which shall re-
fuse to render judgment upon the pretext of the silence, ob-
scurity, or insufficiency of the law shall be liable therefor.
"When there is no statute exactly applicable to the point
in controversy, the custom of the place shall be applied, and,
in the absence thereof, the general principles of law."
A combination of all the aforementioned elements is found in
Puerto Rico:
PUERTO RICO 108 (1953); Dainow, La Mdthode au point de vue de 'Inter-
prdtation dudiciaire--Louisiana, TRAVAUX DE LA SEMAINE INTERNATIONAL DE
DPOlT 411 (Paris 1950).
17. QUEBEC CIVIL CODE art. 11: "A judge cannot refuse to adjudicate under
pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law."
18. MExico CIVIL CODE arts. 18, 19: "Art. 18. Silence, obscurity or insuf-
ficiency of the law does not authorize judges or tribunals to desist from deciding
a controversy."
"Art. 19. Judicial controversies of a civil nature must be determined accord-
ing to the letter of the law or its juridical interpretation. In the absence of law
they shall be determined according to the general principles of law."
1957]
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Civil Code of Puerto Rico, Section 7. "Any court which
shall refuse to render a decision on the pretext of silence, ob-
scurity or unintelligibility of the laws, or for any other rea-
son, shall be held liable therefor.
"When there is no statute applicable to the case at issue,
the court shall decide in accordance with equity, which means
that natural justice, as embodied in the general principles of
jurisprudence and in accepted and established usages and
customs, shall be taken into consideration."
A somewhat different type of provision is found in Switzer-
land:
Civil Code of Switzerland, Article 1. "The written law
governs all legal questions which fall within the letter or
spirit of its provisions.
"When there is no applicable provision, the judge shall
decide in accordance with the customary law, and in default
thereof, according to the rules which he would establish if
he were legislator.
"Herein he should be guided by approved legal doctrine
and tradition."
At this point, it is of particular interest to note the develop-
ments that are taking place in France in the course of its current
civil code revision program. It is not within the scope of this
article to study the origin of the provision in the French Civil
Code, nor to examine the way in which it has been utilized by the
courts during a century and a half (although it might be very
pertinent), but rather to observe the present reaction to the
whole problem by the Civil Code Reform Commission of
France. 9
In a preliminary draft prepared by a subcommittee during
the early stages of the Commission's work, there were contained
the following proposed provisions:
Article 21: If the meaning of a legislative provision is
obscure or ambiguous, the judge shall interpret the provision
19. De la Morandi~re, The Draft of a New French Civil Code: The Role of the
Judge, translated and adapted by Nadelmann in 69 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1956).
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by taking into account the purpose sought by the legislature,
the social needs of the time, and equity.20
Article 24: In the absence of a legislative provision, a
diplomatic treaty, or an administrative regulation, the judge
shall decide according to custom, professional rules, usage,
and equity.2'
After lengthy deliberations, the Commission rejected the pro-
posed articles. Likewise, the provisions of the existing code have
disappeared; and no counterpart is found in the final draft (of
the first part of the code) which the Commission recently sub-
mitted to the Minister of Justice.22
Comparative studies often bring out interesting similarities
and contrasts. Sometimes these are explained by the different
processes of development on account of different historical bases
and backgrounds and methods, sometimes the directions of legal
evolution are produced by local economic and political conditions.
However, it is not a frequent observation to find such a general
issue as the one here examined receiving the curious treatment
in two countries with current code revision programs wherein
each is proposing the change of moving away from its former
position and adopting the position relinquished by the other. It
may be like the story of the two men who exchange their old suits
- each one then feels like he has a new outfit.
At any rate, it is of considerable interest to note the reasons
given by the French Commission 28 in support of its decision to
omit instructions for the unprovided-for case.
The final action of the French Commission, in this part of
the Preliminary Book of the Code, presents exclusively the rules
pertaining to the promulgation and the scope of application of
legislation - the written law - as a source of law. There is no
20. 4 TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RAFORME DU CODE CIVIL 153 (1948-
1949).
21. Id. at 154.
22. See De la Morandi6re, Preliminary Report of the Civil Code Reform Com-
mission of France, translated by Joseph Dainow, 16 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 1
(1955).
23. 4 TEAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE RtFORME DU CODE CIVIL 250-62 (ses-
sion of March 17, 1949) (1948-1949) ; AVANT-PROJET DE CODE CrVIL lere partie,
25, 50 (1953) ; De la Morandikre, Preliminary Report of the Civil Code Reform
Commission of France, translated by Joseph Dainow, 16 LOUIsIANA LAw REvizw
1, 26 (1955) ; De la Morandi~re, The Draft of a New French Civil Code: The
Role of the Judge, translated and adapted by Nadelmann in 69 HARv. L. REV.
1264, 1268 et seq. (1956).
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reference to custom, jurisprudence (court decisions), equity, or
any other sources of law. The Commission felt that a code is not
a doctrinal work but a practical one, and comprises a totality of
individual provisions which are legislative orders addressed to
the individual. These orders must be precise and concrete. Fur-
thermore, texts without much practical significance give the
courts more embarrassment than guidance.
Even if the legislature concedes the existence of other sources
of law, such as custom and equity, these do not obtain their force
from any legislative authorization, and it is therefore improper
to mention them. There are forces which derive from the social,
moral, and economic order which function regardless of legisla-
tion. Interpretation and adaptation of a new code will begin im-
mediately after its promulgation; it is not up to the legislature
to curb or to control this evolutionary process.
Furthermore, it is well-nigh impossible to formulate adequate
definitions of, and distinctions between, such concepts as custom
and usage and judicial precedent. It is therefore better to leave
out what would only be confusing anyway. Besides, there were
apprehensions of two contradictory dangers: on the one hand,
that the judge might be given excessive power to substitute his
own ideas too much; and on the other, that the specific designa-
tions and priorities of custom and equity and so forth would
interfere with judicial freedom and hamper the flexibility neces-
sary for judicial decision. Furthermore, the members of the
Commission could not cite a single Court of Cassation decision
based on custom in a case of silence of the law.
The insertion, in the draft Article 21, of the phrase "social
needs of the time" was meant to show a modern progressive atti-
tude towards the future, but it received a battering in the discus-
sions as being vague and variable as well as unnecessary.
The legislature must repose confidence in the courts. The in-
clusion or omission of directives for cases of silence or insuffi-
ciency of the written law does not really change the functions or
the powers of the courts. In specific situations the Commission
not only recognized but even asserted the importance of other
sources of law, such as custom, equity, and precedent, especially
[Vol. XVII
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(thus far) in the concept of public policy, 24 in conflict of laws,25
and in the abuse of rights.26 However, the objections against a
general article gathered strength from different (and even oppo-
site) points of view so that the rejection of the proposed draft
Articles 21 and 24 was unanimous.
With reference to Articles 4 and 5 of the existing Civil
Code,27 the Commission likewise decided to drop them. The alter-
native, rather than cumulative, reasons were: (1) these texts are
not useful because the principles they embody are not disputed,
(2) they are unnecessary because contained in other codes, (3)
they are out of place in the Civil Code because the denial of
justice provision should be in the Code of Civil Procedure while
the prohibition against general rule-making decisions should be
in the constitution.
The final result is that the French Commission's draft has
dropped the existing provisions and has rejected the proposed
new ones, and therefore it contains nothing on the general sub-
ject of the unprovided-for case.28
II. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATE CONTRACTS
A. The Problem
The great modern codification movement is associated with
the French Civil Code of 1804 and the beginning of the nine-
24. AVANT-PROJET DE CODE CIVIL 378, art. 35 (1953) : "The juridical act
may not have an object prohibited by a mandatory provision of law, or contrary
to public policy especially to good morals."
Id. at 379, art. 43: "An act is not valid if the intention of its author, or
of one of its authors, has been determined by a motive contrary to a mandatory
provision of law or to public policy."
25. AVANT-PROJET DE CODE CIVIL 218, art. 55: "Provisions of foreign
statutes which conflict with French conceptions of public policy in international
relations are inapplicable in France."
Art. 57: "A person may not avail himself of a juridical situation created
pursuant to a foreign law which was rendered applicable only by a fraud on
French law."
26. Id. at 233, art. 147: "Every act or every fact which, by the intention of
its author, by its object or by the circumstances in which it occurred, manifestly
exceeds the normal exercise of a right, is not protected by the law and ultimately
incurs the responsibility of its author.
"This provision does not apply to rights which by their nature or by virtue of
the law can be exercised in a discretionary manner."
27. Page 279 supra.
28. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject in several countries, includ-
ing France, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Louisiana, Mexico, Quebec, Roumania,
and Switzerland, see the reports and discussions on "La Mdthode depuis le Code
Civil de 1804 au point de vue de l'Interpr~tation Judiciaire" in TRAVAUX DE LA
SEMAINE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT 331-554 (Paris 1950).
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teenth century. The objectives of the French Revolution and the
subsequent reactions were incorporated into the Code Napoleon
which, in turn, was the model followed by many other countries.
Feudalism was abolished and the liberty of the individual was
proclaimed. Restraints on ownership were eliminated and the
sanctity of private property was enshrined. The freedom of con-
tract translated into theory and action many of the most signifi-
cant political and economic concepts of the time.
However, times change and the law must follow. During and
after the war of 1914-1918, the French government had to im-
pose rent controls which in effect interfered with the freedom
of contract of individuals. The laws and regulations were called
emergency and temporary, but each time they had to be extended.
The truth of the matter is that the situation never improved
enough to relinquish the controls. In the field of labor, the em-
ployment contract came under government regulation. In an-
other area, the traditional basis of individual responsibility be-
came inadequate to assure compensation of the risks under
which men were placed by the machine developments of a new
age. Social security and its incidents could only be handled by
the government itself. At the same time, the freedom of contract
is something which can be unduly taken advantage of by those
individuals and associations that are economically strong over
those that are economically weak; invariably, the latter category
comprises most of the people.
B. The Question and the Recommended Answer"
Question 24. Should the possibility be extended more
than at present, that for specified contracts the applicable
rules should not be provided by law but by the Crown or
some other state authority in collaboration or after consulta-
tion with the interested parties?
In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, there already exists a cer-
tain amount of government interference or participation in pri-
vate contracts. In some measure, this is a phase of the inevitable
and natural development which is taking place in many modern
countries. The immediate question is more particularly con-
cerned with the nature and the extent of this participation, so as
29. See note 4 ,upra, at no. 5, p. 3.
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to obtain a policy direction from the legislature for the guidance
of Professor Meijers in the drafting of the revised civil code.
It was pointed out that in collective labor contracts such gov-
ernment participation exists through statutory rules of law in
the nature of public policy. The rules governing employment and
wages in the produce-organizations and in the principal trade-
organizations are made in collaboration with the government.
The objection that there is too much interference by the govern-
ment in matters of private law is countered by the fact that the
collaboration of the public authority is a guarantee that the par-
ties' contract will also take into consideration the general wel-
fare of society.
The preliminary answer recommended by the Minister of
Justice (and Professor Meijers) was in the affirmative, that
for certain contracts there should be standard regulations. The
standard regulations should be of a supplementary nature and
not a matter of public policy. It was contemplated that a royal
order-in-council might be necessary for this purpose.
C. Issues Raised by the Legislative Committee0
On this problem, only two questions were asked:
(1) Of what use is it to make standard clauses containing
rules which are merely supplementary in nature if the parties
can by agreement derogate from these provisions?
(2) What is meant by "certain contracts"?
D. Reply by Minister of Justice1
(1) Of what use is it to make standard clauses containing
regulations established by the government and its agencies, and
by trade organizations. In addition to these rules, which are
matters of public policy and mandatory in their nature, it is
proposed to create the possibility of having standard regulations
which are supplementary or directory in nature.
This will prevent the formulation of standard clauses by
the party (or the group) that is the strongest. While parties
may agree to circumvent these rules, the moral value of standard
regulations made with government participation will always
30. Id. no. 20, p. 2.
31. Id. no. 25, p. 4.
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be a warning. Furthermore, if the deviation is too prejudicial
for one party, the judge might find that there has been an abuse
of circumstances.
(2) It is not timely yet to say for which contracts such
standard regulations would be established by the participation of
public authorities.
E. Discussion in the Chamber 2
When this Question 24 was reported by the legislative com-
mittee on the floor of the Second Chamber, members immedi-
ately raised the two issues which had been taken up by the
Committee: (1) the directory nature of the proposed kind of
rules, and (2) the enumeration of contracts to be affected.
In the discussion it was principally Professor Meijers who
gave the explanations. On the first issue, he illustrated the im-
portance and significance of rules of a directory nature by point-
ing out that the greater part of Book III of the present Civil
Code on "Obligations" consists of such directory rules. The in-
fluence of directory rules must not be underestimated, especially
when they are drawn up under the guidance of a neutral party.
In the situations here contemplated, it can be expected that the
agencies entrusted with the making of the directory rules will
be neutral.
Nor should it be feared that parties will readily deviate from
these directory rules and tend to make up their own standard
clauses. That might happen if the rules were formulated with-
out the consultation and collaboration of the interested parties;
such would not be the case.
One argument directed against the existing system of rules
established in the formal statute law is the difficulty to effect
changes. In the system here proposed, the standard regulations
made up under the supervision of appropriate public agencies
will be much easier to change - if there is need to change.
On the second issue, Professor Meijers could not yet say for
which contracts the proposed regulations would be established,
except that they would probably not be extended to the contracts
of sale and lease. Especially for the general rules of sale, it is
better to remain with the existing provisions of the law. How-
32. Id. at 2873 (Sept. 8, 1953).
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ever, this need not prevent the establishment of standard clauses
for certain special kinds of sale, such as those in the grain trade.
A third issue raised in the discussion from the floor dealt
with a matter which is of particular interest to the Netherlands
and may not be very meaningful elsewhere. This pertained to
the question of whether the establishment of standard regu-
lations for certain contracts would impinge upon the field of
the "public-trade-organizations." Professor Meijers answered
that there was no intention to place difficulties in the path of
the development of these organizations. It will take considerable
time before they are able to cover many areas of social relations,
and in any event there are some matters in which they have no
power. These organizations can only make rules that are bind-
ing on their own members. If there should develop a sort of
produce-guild, in which manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers
would all be organized, it would be possible for both parties of
a private contract to be bound by the rules of their single or-
ganization. In any event, there will always be numerous cases
in which one of the parties does not come within the autonomy
of the public-trade-organization, and for these cases the rules
proposed under Question 24 would be applicable.
F. Final Action
At the conclusion of the house discussion, the vote taken
adopted an answer substantially as recommended by the Minister
and Professor Meijers, as follows:
Answer 24. The possibility should exist that for specified
contracts the applicable rules should be prescribed by the
Crown or some other state authority with the collaboration
or after consultation with interested parties (standard regu-
lations). Standard regulations should contain only faculta-
tive legal provisions.
Despite the existence of current government regulations and
the marked measure of its participation in private contracts, the
decision on this question constitutes the introduction of an ad-
ditional and new phase of the subject.
G. Comparative Comments
In many countries, there has been the development since
World War I, and especially during and after World War II,
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of government controls in various forms ranging from fixed
prices and standard clauses to the complete nationalization of a
whole industry. These are too well known to need documenta-
tion and too numerous to need illustration. From a comparative
viewpoint it is noteworthy that the continuation of some gov-
ernmental controls in the Netherlands is assumed, and it is
interesting to observe their method of approach and the preser-
vation of individual protections which are in keeping with their
existing institutions and economy. There are indications that
the French project will incorporate a number of limitations on
what had been the complete freedom of contract and the full
protection of private property. It would seem that the same may
well be expected in any modern civil code revision program, al-
though the degree and the details will vary.
III. THE EFFECT OF CUSTOM AS AGAINST LEGISLATION
A. The Problem
The discussion of "custom" in the earlier part of this article
concerned custom as a source of law in case of silence or insuf-
ficiency of legislation (written law). At this point, the situation
envisaged is the case for which there is appropriate legislative
provision. However, as already mentioned, times change and
new activities emerge; in the daily life and routines of the
market-place, new practices develop and those which prove satis-
factory obtain more expanded and general usage. The problem
here is whether under any circumstance a written law can be-
come obsolescent and be superseded by the spontaneous prac-
tices which have become sufficiently widespread to be classified
as custom.
In the common law, the historical development of case law
and statute law, together with the contest between the courts
and the legislature, might not leave much room to question the
supremacy of legislation within the strict area of its applica-
tion (pretermitting the judicial maneuvers of "interpretation"
and "distinction"). However, in the civil law systems, legis-
lation is treated more liberally so as to adjust the scope of ap-
plication to a wider or narrower range. This may be due in part
to the nature of civil code provisions which often state such
broad general principles that courts are intended to have a con-
siderable range of flexibility in making adjustments to the
changing needs and practices of the times.
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It would be a mistake to assume that the word "custom"
means the same thing in different countries, or that it has a
universally agreed meaning all the time in any one system.
Likewise, definitions are difficult and different for "usage" and
for "practices." In the present discussion, as in most cases, the
meaning of the terms is to be understood primarily from the
context and fact situations.
B. The Question and the Recommended Answer 3
Question 25. Should the rule be retained that a [written]
law can lose effect only by a later law and not through falling
into disuse?
In presenting this question, the Minister pointed out a num-
ber of different opinions that are currently held in the Nether-
lands.
To begin with, there is one opinion that custom is a source
of law and has the same force as written law. Another opinion
considers that custom can oniy be expressed by the people
through the legislative process. By contrast, some modern
writers who favor customary law think that the legislature
should not have anything to do with it, because legislation re-
quires strict obedience.
Since parties can agree upon provisions in their contracts
whereby they deviate from rules of a directory nature, some
maintain that custom can displace such supplementary or di-
rectory rules, but it cannot be recognized when contrary to
mandatory rules of public policy.
Clauses in common use may sometimes be deemed to form
part of a contract even though not expressly stipulated. In daily
life, it is difficult to distinguish between clauses in common use
and practices that amount to "usage." Accordingly, there is
also the view that usage may be able to displace rules of a sup-
plementary or directory nature.
In the light of these various opinions, it is necessary to have
some clarification and a policy decision for guidance in the
matter.
In the preliminary answer, the Minister recommended the
retention of the rule that a (written) law can lose its effect
33. Id. no. 5, p. 4.
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only by virtue of a later law and not merely through falling into
disuse. However, he added that rules of a directory nature can
lose their force by a deviating usage.
C. The Legislative Committee and Final ActionW4
On the whole, the committee agreed with the recommended
answer and raised only one issue with reference to the word
"can" in the last sentence. One view was that, without this
word, it would express the thought that usage displaces law re-
gardless of whether the parties have so stipulated (as distin-
guished from an express stipulation deviating from the rule).
Another view preferred to retain the word "can" in order to
express the thought that the judge is free to decide the question.
In his reply, the Minister explained that there are certain re-
quirements before a particular pattern of behavior is considered
to be a usage, and therefore the word "can" should be kept in
the answer.
No further issues were raised, and the recommended answer
was duly given final approval, as follows:
Answer 25. The rule should be retained that a law can
lose effect only by a later law and not through falling into
disuse, but with the reservation that legal dispositions of a
regulatory nature may be abrogated by a deviating usage.
The first part of this final answer repeats the existing law;
the last part is new and constitutes a considerable relaxation of
the strictness of the older rule. Even though it is a compromise
solution, it indicates a significant move in the direction of more
explicit recognition of usage and custom in the fabric of the
growth of the law.
D. Comparative Comments
For several centuries before the Revolution, customary law
prevailed in most of France. In fact, there were about 350 of
these local "customs." The Civil Code of 1804 was, in one of
its most significant aspects, a work of unification and the dis-
placement of customs generally.85
34. Id. no. 20, p. 2; no. 25, p. 6; no. 30, p. 1
35. See P#wsou, The Codifiotion of the French Oustoms, 38 MIcH. L. REV. 765(1940).
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The draft of the original French Civil Code30 contained in
its proposed Preliminary Book three articles, as follows:
Title I, Article 5. Customs result from a long series of
actions constantly repeated,,which have acquired the force of
a tacit and common agreement.
Title VI, Article 2. Laws are repealed either entirely or
partially, by other laws.
Title VI, Article 3. The repeal is either express or im-
plied. It is express when it is literally declared by a subse-
quent law. It is implied when the new law contains provisions
contrary to those of the former laws.
These three proposed articles were victims of the French
legislative process; they do not appear in the Civil Code that
was adopted in 1804, although all three were picked up and
preserved in Louisiana.37 No inference can be drawn from this
omission, nor are the reasons necessary for this discussion. Their
purport is clear, that a written law can only be rendered inef-
fective by a later law and that, while custom is recognized, its
scope cannot infringe upon an area of express law. The same
is true in Louisiana, 8 where the French projet articles were
adopted.
It is of interest to note that, in the current work of the
French Civil Code Reform Commission, the previous position
is being rigorously preserved. In fact, the Commission has
reached back to the 1800 draft for a text to consolidate this
position, as follows:
"A [written] law can be repealed or modified in whole
or in part only by another law, saving the provisions of the
Constitution relating to diplomatic treaties [international
conventions] ."9
The commentary on this proposed article states that it "im-
plicitly discards the repeal of a law through disuse." 40
Evidently, the decision in the Netherlands that a deviating
usage can discard legal dispositions of a directory nature indi-
36. PROJET DE CODE CVIL (1800).
37. LA. CIVL CODE arts. 3, 22, 23 (1870).
38. Custom cannot be urged against a rule of law nor can it create a contract.
Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1949).
39. AVANT-PROJET DE CODE CIVIL 210, art. 10 (1953).
40. Id. at 52 (Exposd des Motifs).
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cates that, while they preserved the basic position, they did not
adhere to it with the same strictness as the French Commission.
Granted that the Dutch may not have gone very far and that
their decision was a compromise, their move was in an opposite
direction. Perhaps it reflects some influence from their Scandi-
navian neighbors.
The legal system of the Scandinavian countries has been de-
scribed as differing from both the continental civil law on the
one hand and the English common law on the other. The earliest
codes of private law in Europe were those of Denmark,41 Nor-
way,42 and Sweden, 48 but these codes were not very comprehen-
sive or detailed, and much was left to be filled in as need de-
veloped. There was always a great confidence in the judiciary,
and the practices of the people became confirmed in the court
decisions. The development of the law was based a great deal
on the practices of the community rather than on the courts of
the community. Custom, incorporating the general practices of
the people and the confirming judicial decisions, still forms a
principal source of law. All law is either in legislation or custom,
and also in what is sometimes called the legal conviction of the
people. If a custom develops which is different from the written
law, there is a strong likelihood that the custom will be con-
sidered as representing the real needs and desires of the people
and that it will be sustained over the unavailing written law.
Recent legislation is not likely to be superseded, but a very old
law would not have much chance of being sustained against a
new and modern custom.44
No conclusions are sought to be drawn from these experi-
ences of the current civil code revision program in the Nether-
lands. Different people in different countries with different
historical and legal backgrounds sometimes reach the same
41. Denmark's first code came into effect in 1240, and its modern code in
1683.
42. Norway's first code came into effect in 1275, and the revision in 1688
modelled on the Danish one.
43. Sweden's first code is dated 1387 and its revision 1734.
44. These brief generalizations are meant to identify a general position, and
are not meant to be capsule descriptions of the separate legal systems in the sev-
eral Scandinavian countries. For more information, see ORFIELD, THE GROWTH
OF SCANDINAVIAN LAw (1953), especially "customary law" in Denmark at p. 14,
in Norway at p. 170, in Sweden at p. 252. Leivestad, Cu8tom a8 a Type of Law
in Norway, 54 L.Q. REv. 95 (1938) ; Munch-Peterson, Main Features of Scandi-
navian Law, 43 L.Q. REV. 366 (1927); Von Eyben, Judicial Law-Making in
Scandinavia, 5 Am. J. ComP. L. 112 (1956).
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solution for a given problem, but sometimes they take different
positions reflecting their reactions and decisions on the basis of
their own circumstances. An attempt is made to understand and
appreciate the nature of and the reasons for the respective solu-
tions adopted. In some instances, this may emerge from objec-
tive facts and considerations; in other instances, it may seem
like a rationalization of a more subjective or instinctive reaction.
There is no implication herein of relative evaluations of good or
bad in any of the comparative comments and observations. The
purpose of this study is to try to understand some of the legal
developments and the professional thinking in other countries.
